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TEACHING LAW THROUGH CONTRACTS AND CARDOZO* 
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER** 
Contracts might be regarded as the most durable of first-year law school 
subjects.  After all, it was through contracts that Christopher Langdell 
introduced the case method.1  More than a century later, contracts remains a 
required course not only at Harvard, where Langdell taught, but at virtually 
every other American law school.  Yet, contracts might also be regarded as the 
least durable of first-year subjects.  Nearly three decades ago Grant Gilmore 
examined contracts and, in a brilliant essay, pronounced it dead.2  It is not clear 
how Gilmore’s claim should be interpreted or whether it is true.  But this much 
seems undeniable: many of the subjects that were once encompassed within the 
common law of contracts have been hived off into separate domains, often 
governed by statute and treated in specialized law school courses.  Some of the 
classic common law cases that still populate contracts casebooks would today 
be regarded as falling under the rubric of sales, employment law, insurance 
law, consumer protection law, family law, real estate law, and so on. 
If prone to dramatics, one might say that the guiding ambition of classical 
contract law—namely, to produce a unified doctrine applicable to all 
agreements and promises, regardless of either their subject matter or the 
identity of their makers—is a manifest failure.  Why should every American 
law student be required to take a long course on a failed doctrine?  I have two 
answers to that question (I don’t mean to suggest that every contracts teacher 
should answer the same way).  First, the issues addressed by the common law 
of contacts endure even when the common law’s resolution of those issues 
does not.  For example, in any area (sales, employment, real estate, and so on) 
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 1. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 12-14 (1974).  As Gilmore’s showed, it is 
arguable that Langdell not only invented the case method through contracts, but invented 
contracts through the case method.  Id. 
 2. Id. 
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where parties may bind themselves by mutual agreement, issues will arise if 
one party makes an offer, and the other responds affirmatively but varies the 
terms.  Have the parties “agreed” on something sufficient to produce legally 
binding obligations?  Or does the variation in terms mean that the parties have 
no agreement at all?  The common law, of course, treated these issues through 
the rather inflexible “mirror-image rule,” pursuant to which a putative 
“acceptance” that varied the terms of an offer was not an acceptance at all, but 
a counter-offer and a rejection of the original offer.  I do not know whether that 
ancient rule would provide sound guidance to a lawyer today facing an issue 
about whether, say, in the state of New Jersey minor discrepancies between 
offer and acceptance will vitiate an apparent contract for the sale of real estate.  
But that’s not the point.  Having encountered the old common law cases, a 
competent lawyer will hit the books (or boot up the computer) to find out 
whether in New Jersey there are special rules applicable to real estate 
contracts, whether or not the “mirror-image rule” is strictly observed, and so 
on.  Once a lawyer recognizes that an issue exists, the process of identifying 
relevant statutes and rules is, if not always easy, nonetheless pedestrian.  The 
trick is to see the issue in the first place. 
The second objective for my contracts course is deeper and more 
interesting—or it’s more interesting to me, at any rate.  As part of the first-year 
curriculum, contracts introduces not only the particular issues that surround the 
making and enforcement of private agreements, but also more general 
questions about the nature of law.  It participates, along with other first-year 
courses, in the famous and mysterious task of teaching students to “think like 
lawyers.”  That project has many facets, but one important component is to 
teach students what sorts of claims will and won’t fly as legal arguments.  
More precisely, students must acquire a feel for what arguments might be 
persuasive to judges, or more precisely still, for what arguments other lawyers 
might regard as plausibly persuasive to judges, since legal arguments will carry 
weight to the extent that somebody (even if wrongly) believes that those 
arguments have a chance to convince some judge (or another authoritative 
legal decision-maker) to do something.  And how are students supposed to 
anticipate what judges might find persuasive?  They have to put themselves in 
the judge’s shoes; less metaphorically, they have to imagine themselves as 
judges.  To “think like lawyers,” students must first try to “think like judges.” 
Students don’t always feel comfortable imagining themselves as judges.  
To be sure, some of them may hope eventually to be judges; they may even 
harbor a secret ambition to be Supreme Court justices.  When they study the 
law, though, they often do so from the standpoint of “rule-followers” or 
“instruction-takers.”  They imagine themselves not as judges but as first-year 
associates or even as soon-to-be-takers-of-the-bar-exam.  They assume that 
judges, by experience and training, “know the law.”  The students accordingly 
suppose that they cannot hope to “think like judges” until after they learn the 
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law.  And, of course, to some extent the students are correct; there are indeed 
things that judges know which students don’t.  For example, judges (unlike 
students) know that there is a doctrine which travels under the name “the parol 
evidence rule” and which has something to say about the circumstances under 
which written contracts will trump or exclude other agreements.  But, in 
general, it gets things backward to suppose that one must first “know the law” 
in order to learn to “think like a judge.”  Students can easily be informed about 
the existence of rules and doctrines.  The hard part, for judges as well as for 
students, is figuring out what it means to know the rule or doctrine—figuring 
out, in other words, how the doctrine might be applied, when exceptions might 
be created, and so on.  To do that, one must take some position about how 
judges do and should use the discretion granted them within the American 
political system.  Judges’ approaches to that problem will undoubtedly be 
influenced by their experience, and some of that experience will undoubtedly 
come from aspects of legal practice which are familiar to most judges but 
foreign to virtually all students.  Nevertheless, a large of part of legal education 
in general, and first-year legal education in particular, involves equipping 
students with insights and theories through which they can comprehend the 
goals, concerns and impulses which shape judicial creativity. 
Therein lies one often overlooked purpose behind the case method.  
Students must, of course, learn how to separate “holding” from “dictum,” since 
they will need that skill in practice.  Still, if the point of assigning cases were 
to communicate their “holdings,” the case method would be crushingly 
inefficient.  Why have students scour multiple pages, highlighters poised-and-
ready, looking for the crucial passage, when we could assign books and articles 
that state the point more baldly?  The case method, however, accomplishes 
more.  A great aid in getting students to “think like judges” is the fact that 
judges write opinions which purport to explain their decision-making process.  
Properly applied, the case method capitalizes on this opportunity.  By careful 
dissection of judicial opinions, students begin to appreciate the variety of ways 
in which the judicial mind works.  They learn what sorts of creativity the legal 
community expects and accepts from judges, since the reasons which judges 
offer in opinions are submitted to that community with the hope that the 
arguments will be deemed legitimate.  And students are also provoked to 
speculate, when judges write opinions that seem disingenuous, about why 
judges wrote in the way they did—about, in other words, what might really be 
going on “behind the scenes.”  Students thereby (whether they realize it or not) 
use judicial opinions as windows upon judicial creativity, and hence as guides 
to possibilities for creative legal argument in general. 
Learning to “think like judges” means, among other things, coming to 
appreciate the variety of objectives that judges might have when they decide a 
case.  Judges might try to produce a just result in the particular controversy 
before them.  They may try to set a precedent that produces good results in the 
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future.  And, of course, there are a variety of criteria that might be used to 
assess what counts as “good results.”  We might hope that the legal system 
would resolve controversies in ways that are substantively desirable, consistent 
with democratic principles, predictable, and reasonably cheap.  In practice, of 
course, people will disagree both about what these goals mean (which results 
are “substantively desirable?”) and about what to do when the goals come into 
conflict or tension with one another, as they inevitably do. 
Regardless of their objectives, judges also face a more technical set of 
concerns.  They must decide among means as well as ends; they must, in other 
words, select which legal or judicial “techniques” to employ in pursuit of their 
objectives.3  If, for example, a judge wants to bring about a particular result in 
the case before her, she will often be able to do so either through a factual 
determination or through a legal ruling.  Which route she chooses will, of 
course, have an impact both upon possibilities for appeal (unless the judge sits 
on a court of last resort) and upon how her decision will affect future cases.  A 
judge who wishes to influence subsequent cases will want to emphasize legal, 
rather than factual, issues.  She will have to choose among multiple ways of 
framing her disposition.  She can propose a flexible standard, which openly 
invites the exercise of discretion by later judges (e.g., “a promisee’s reliance 
will not render a promise enforceable unless the reliance was reasonable and 
injustice would result if the promise were not enforced”).  Or she can attempt 
to articulate a mechanical test, which seeks to limit the discretion of her 
successors (e.g., “reliance, no matter how reasonable, will never render a 
promise binding in the absence of bargained-for consideration”).  Regardless 
of whether her proposed rule is flexible or mechanical, the judge may define its 
domain broadly or narrowly: she may announce a rule that purports to govern 
all contracts of any kind, or she may announce a rule limited to sales contracts 
between merchants. 
These questions of legal technique are crucial to the process of “thinking 
like a judge,” and they are uncharted territory for most non-lawyers, including 
new students freshly arrived at law school.  Acquainting students with these 
problems, and providing them with a set of theoretical tools by which to 
analyze the problems, is one crucial component of a first-year legal education.  
For that purpose, contracts is splendid.  To begin with, the substantive policy 
interests at stake in contract law are relatively muted.  Contract law provides 
parties with an opportunity to establish what legally binding norms will govern 
their relationship—the parties can, in a sense, make law for themselves.  
Contract litigation usually arises because, in one way or another, parties failed 
to take advantage of that opportunity: either the parties arguably never entered 
 
 3. I borrow the concept of “judicial techniques” from P.S. Atiyah’s excellent essay, 
Judicial Techniques and the Law of Contract, in P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 244-74 
(1986), which I assign during the second semester of my contracts course. 
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into a contract at all, or they entered into a contract but did not address some 
issue which later became the focal point of a dispute.  In a setting where (by 
hypothesis) the parties were free to allocate some risk in whatever way they 
chose, and where (again by hypothesis) neither party insisted on a clear 
allocation of that risk, it will be rare that justice or economic policy will 
generate strong reasons to allocate the risk one way or the other.  No doubt 
some of the contributors to this symposium will disagree, but I find that the 
equities in contracts cases are rarely poignant enough to set my blood boiling, 
save for those exceptional instances where there is a strong smell of deceit or 
where the court proposes (rightly or, more often, wrongly) to ignore the 
parties’ intentions.4  Perhaps it is simply the “whiff of fraud” (or, if not fraud, 
then some other sort of malfeasance) that makes these cases provocative, rather 
than the courts’ decision to frame the cases in terms of whether or not the 
parties’ intentions should be honored.  The latter choice is itself a matter of 
judicial technique; it’s always possible, and often easy, to recharacterize the 
cases in other ways.  So, for example, Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining 
Co. can be recharacterized as a “mistake” or an “implied term” case, in which 
the issue is how to deal with a risk (namely, that the re-grading project would 
be very expensive) not specifically addressed in the contract, and Williams v. 
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co. can be recharacterized as an “offer-and-
acceptance” case about whether Mrs. Williams consented to the fine print in an 
adhesion contract.  In the vast run of cases, though, the point of contract law 
will be to produce a predictable pattern of decisions (thereby reducing the cost 
of adjudication, and providing guidance for parties who care to seek it5) and to 
 
 4. Controversial cases in which courts allowed public policy to trump an agreement 
between the parties include Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 
1962) (refusing to enforce mining company’s obligation to re-grade land; according to the court, 
the obligation would have involved gross “economic waste”); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 
(Ill. 1979) (refusing to enforce a contract between a cohabiting couple on the ground that to do so 
would undermine the institution of marriage); Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 
F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (refusing to enforce the “add-on” clause of an installment purchase 
contract on the ground that the clause was unconscionable).  Interestingly, one might find a 
“whiff of fraud” in all three of these cases; one might suspect that the mining company never 
intended to regrade the land in Peevyhouse, that the “husband” in Hewitt tricked his “wife” into 
believing that a formal marriage was unnecessary, and that Walker-Thomas never explained its 
“add-on” clause to Mrs. Williams.  What’s more, in two of the three cases—Peevyhouse and 
Hewitt—the “tortfeasor” (if there was one) actually benefited from the court’s departure from 
ordinary contract principles! 
 5. Since most contracts are performed rather than litigated, and since there are costs both to 
researching the law and to raising the possibility of breach in the course of negotiations, parties 
may not care what the law says.  One especially striking illustration of these incentives is 
supplied by Stuart Macaulay’s famous article, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A 
Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963) in which he reported that house counsel in the 
paper business continued to employ a standard clause which they all knew had been held 
unenforceable by Benjamin Cardozo and the New York Court of Appeals.  Id. at 60. 
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protect whatever modest reliance interests might be deemed “reasonable” 
despite the fact that the relying party could have protected itself by negotiating 
a contractual term but did not. 
With substantive concerns thus bounded, technical issues become the 
principal focus of judicial creativity in contract law.  Judges must figure out 
how best to devise a legal doctrine which is stable and predictable and which 
can accommodate whatever intuitions they (and their colleagues and 
successors) have about reasonable reliance interests and other “equities of the 
case.”  That challenge is what provoked the quest for a stable, unified common 
law doctrine of Contracts.  It has seemed natural to many judges and lawyers—
and it seems natural, I find, to most first-year law students—to suppose that the 
contract law should consist mostly of formal rules that apply to all promises 
without regard to their content or their maker.  After all, we permit people to 
make contracts about almost anything, and most of us believe that there is 
some general duty to keep promises.  Moreover, if (as I have suggested) 
concerns about morality or economic policy are destined to have only modest 
bite in contracts cases, then perhaps we can craft general rules without 
worrying too much about the exceptional cases which the rule gets “wrong.”  
The “wrong” will be relatively minor since parties will be able to protect 
themselves by contracting around the rule; hence we can live with the “wrong” 
in exchange for the benefit of a clear rule. 
Yet, however plausible all this might sound in the abstract, contract law 
has always been dogged by, and has often yielded to, arguments in favor of 
special exceptions and fact-sensitive judgments.  We may say that “a promise 
is a promise,” but when confronted with particular cases, our reactions often 
vary depending on who promised what to whom and under what 
circumstances.  And while broad, bright-line rules may be cheap and easy to 
apply, they turn out to be fragile.6  If a blunt rule seems to produce unjust 
results, judges will be tempted to abandon, limit, modify, or circumvent it.  
 
 6. Karl Llewellyn criticized contract professors for supposing that one could draw “safe 
conclusions as to business cases of the more ordinary variety” on the basis of “what courts or 
scholars rule about the idiosyncratic desires of one A to see one B climb a fifty-foot greased 
flagpole or push a peanut across the Brooklyn Bridge.”  Karl N. Llewellyn, Our Case-Law of 
Contract: Offer and Acceptance (pt. 2), 48 YALE L. J. 779, 785-86 (1939).  Llewellyn cautioned 
against assuming that identical principles would apply in family settings and in business settings, 
and he suggested that “[t]he influence of the facts relative to the influence of the normally 
applicable rule increases roughly with the square of the peculiarity of the facts.”  Id.  After these 
sensible observations, however, Llewellyn concluded that “if a peculiar case is decided in true 
accordance with a rule in use in normal cases, that is excellent indication of the living power of 
that normal rule; it has overcome even tough and troublesome facts.”  Id.  I am not so sure.  The 
unflinching application of a rule to facts it does not fit may eventually generate criticism of the 
rule, criticism that might weaken even the core applications of the rule.  If I were interested in the 
longevity of a legal doctrine, I would want to confine it to that domain in which it seemed to 
produce reasonable results. 
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Over the course of the twentieth century contract law moved in two 
particularistic directions, fragmenting into multiple domains defined by 
subject-matter (such as sales or employment law) and embracing openly 
substantive standards which invite judges to assess the equities of cases one-
by-one (such as the doctrine of promissory estoppel or the Restatement 
Second’s remarkably flexible provisions governing mistake and 
impracticability).7 
Contracts may be, as Gilmore suggested, dead.  The quest for a grand 
unified common law doctrine of contracts may be a failure.  For pedagogical 
purposes, it does not really matter: even if contracts is dead, there is good 
reason to teach twentieth century contracts common law to first-year law 
students in the twenty-first century.  The story of American contract law’s 
evolution is a wonderful vehicle for teaching students about judicial 
techniques.  That narrative is made richer and more compelling because 
populated by judges and other law-makers who were brilliantly self-conscious 
about questions of judicial technique: Oliver Wendell Holmes, Benjamin 
Cardozo, Arthur Corbin, Jerome Frank, and Karl Llewellyn, among others.8 
For sheer legal brilliance, my favorites among these are Llewellyn and 
Corbin, but for teaching purposes my favorite is Cardozo, because he was so 
acutely sensitive to the requirements of the judicial role and because he wanted 
so much (too much, as I shall shortly explain) from contracts doctrine.  Among 
Cardozo’s opinions, my favorite is Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua 
County Bank of Jamestown.9  Allegheny College is the focal point of my first-
semester syllabus.  Cardozo’s opinion is puzzling and provocative in a way 
that virtually compels students to wonder what the great common law judge 
was up to.  And—as I hope to convince you in a moment—once they ask that 
question, the opinion pulls them in deeper and deeper, begetting ever more 
sophisticated questions and hypotheses about the judicial role. 
If you’ve read this far in an article about teaching contracts, you probably 
know Allegheny College well—but I’ll provide a brief summary, just in case 
 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (promissory estoppel), §§ 151-58 
(mistake) and §§ 261-81 (impossibility and frustration) (1979).  Although her deconstructive 
approach is not generally to my liking, Clare Dalton does a nice job pointing up the complete 
indeterminacy of the Restatement provisions on mistake, impossibility, and frustration.  Clare 
Dalton, The Deconstruction of Contract, 94 YALE L. J. 997, 1063-65 (1985). 
 8. Here I want to throw a bouquet to the wonderful editing of FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT 
GILMORE AND ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).  
The book has preserved both the rich wit and insight of minds like Cardozo, Corbin and 
Llewellyn, supplemented them with the editors’ own distinctive perspectives, and provided 
students with ample exposure to the challenging (sometimes quirky) cases and doctrines that 
provoked those thinkers.  The result is an intellectually challenging, and uniquely rewarding, set 
of materials from which to teach contracts.  There are rumblings from Aspen about a new edition; 
I, for one, hope that any changes will be very modest indeed. 
 9. 159 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1927). 
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you’ve forsaken it in favor of more modern and “relevant” decisions, or in case 
you are, perhaps, that elusive “generalist” reader whom law reviews always 
aspire to reach!  In 1921, Mary Yates Johnston had pledged to give $5000 to 
Allegheny College.  Johnston made her promise in a formal written instrument; 
it provided, among other things, that her pledge would be fulfilled not later 
than thirty days after her death, that it should be known as the “Mary Yates 
Johnston Memorial Fund,” and that it should be used to “educate students 
preparing for the Ministry.”  Johnston made a $1000 payment to the College 
during her lifetime (this fact, as we shall see, took on great importance in 
Cardozo’s construction of the case), but changed her will prior to her death and 
left nothing more to the College.  The College sued her estate seeking the 
balance of the pledge.  The question was whether Johnston’s promise to the 
College was unenforceable for want of consideration. 
Cardozo labored mightily to demonstrate that there was consideration for 
the promise.  His analysis was intricate and difficult to grasp, but, as Professor 
Alfred Konefsky has demonstrated,10 the skeleton of Cardozo’s reasoning can 
be summarized relatively briefly.  Cardozo endorsed a demanding formulation 
of the bargain theory of consideration, pursuant to which “[t]he promise and 
the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other.”11 In other 
words, Johnston’s promise was enforceable only if she gave it in order to get 
something that she wanted from the College, and only if the College would not 
have given her what she wanted had she not made her promise.  This 
formulation of the consideration doctrine might seem devastating to the 
College’s case, since charitable pledges are generally regarded as gifts, for 
which donors demand nothing.  But Cardozo went on to hold that the bargain 
formula was not so hard to satisfy as it first seemed.  In the past, he said, 
various considerations, including “conceptions of public policy” had “more or 
less subconsciously” led judges to soften the doctrine’s application.12  Some 
precedents invoked or pointed to “the innovation of promissory estoppel.”13  
According to Cardozo, the upshot of all these “irregularities of form”14 in the 
consideration doctrine was that its elements might sometimes be deemed 
satisfied by implication from normative concerns about moral duty or social 
policy, rather than on the basis of more nakedly factual argument about what 
the parties had done.  Hence, in particular, the College might be able to show 
 
 10. Alfred S. Konefsky, How to Read, Or at Least Not Misread, Cardozo in the Allegheny 
College Case, 36 BUFF. L. REV. 645, 654 (1987).  My summary here differs from Konefsky’s 
only with regard to minor expositional points; I think that Konefsky’s doctrinal analysis is 
correct. 
 11. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174 (quoting the opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes in 
Wisc. & Mich. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379, 386 (1903)). 
 12. Id. at 175. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
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on the basis of “implications inherent in [the social practice of] subscription 
and acceptance”15 that Johnston had gotten something in exchange for her 
promise.  And, indeed, Cardozo went on to imply both that Johnston had 
demanded that the College should publicize her gift in order “to perpetuate her 
name,” and next to imply that the College had promised to provide such 
publicity when it accepted the $1000 which Johnston donated before her 
death.16  The College’s implied promise, made in response to Johnston’s 
implied demand, provided the consideration, which rendered her promise 
enforceable.  Cardozo gave no indication that these conclusions depended in 
any way upon triable issues of fact about whether Mary Yates Johnston was 
really interested in “perpetuat[ing] her name”; on the contrary, the implications 
were apparently sustainable as a matter of law.  In any event, Cardozo not only 
reversed the trial and intermediate appellate court decisions dismissing the 
College’s complaint, but entered judgment on the College’s behalf. 
Cardozo bobbed and wove.  He articulated a tough test—the bargain 
theory of consideration, in full Holmesian rigor—but then held that its 
elements might be satisfied by “implication.”17  He nodded in the direction of 
the controversial doctrine of promissory estoppel, but then declared that the 
case could be decided without “recourse to th[at] innovation.”18  At the end of 
his article, Professor Konefsky identified, without endeavoring to answer, the 
crucial question raised by Cardozo’s circuitous path: “What was Cardozo’s 
larger purpose in this and similar enterprises?”19  Why, in other words, did 
Cardozo offer so complicated an argument when he could easily have crafted 
much simpler ones?  A prominent school of thought supposes that Cardozo 
was skillfully but somewhat deceptively manipulating doctrine to disguise a 
creative effort to improve contract law.  Grant Gilmore observed about 
Cardozo that, although he was “a truly innovative judge[,]” he “was 
accustomed to hide his light under a bushel.  The more innovative the decision 
to which he had persuaded his brethren on the court, the more his opinion 
strained to prove that no novelty—not the slightest departure from prior law—
was involved.”20  Leon Lipson analogized Cardozo’s opinion in Allegheny 
College to an optical illusion.  According to Lipson, Cardozo’s “problem was 
that on the consideration side he had a solid rule but shaky facts; on the 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175. 
 17. Id. at 176. 
 18. Id. at 175. 
 19. Konefsky, supra note 10, at 686 n.83.  As Konefsky’s formulation of the question 
suggests, Cardozo’s intricate style in Allegheny College was not unique to that case; it 
characterized many of his other contracts and torts opinions.  On the other hand, Cardozo could 
sometimes be breathtakingly direct and to-the-point—as in, for example, Wood v. Lucy, Lady 
Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). 
 20. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 75 (1977). 
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promissory-estoppel side he had a shaky rule but (potentially) solid facts.”  
Lipson suggested that, in effect, Cardozo “twirled” the facts and the law “to 
give the impression that he had solid facts fitting a solid rule.”21 
Even if these descriptions were fully accurate (and I’m pretty sure that they 
are not), Cardozo’s opinion would be a wonderful vehicle for inspiring 
students to ponder what it means to “think like a judge.”  First of all, if 
Cardozo’s goal in Allegheny College was to manipulate doctrine in order to 
bring about an innovation, why not forthrightly announce a new rule?  What 
did he hope to gain from so much complexity and subtlety?  Was he just 
hoping to confuse lawyers?  If so, were lawyers actually duped by Cardozo?  
Or could they see what he was up to?  These questions are made all the more 
compelling by the fact that Cardozo is revered by many lawyers as the greatest 
American common law judge of the twentieth century.  In the classroom at 
NYU, I point out the window, and remind my students that there’s a rather 
good law school up the street named after this fellow.22  If Allegheny College is 
a self-conscious act of deception, why do lawyers hold Cardozo in such 
esteem?  Is deceit what we want from judges?  If so, what would that tell us 
about the judicial role and the nature of judicial creativity?  If not, is there 
some better way to understand why Cardozo chose the strategy he did? 
Moreover, if we view Allegheny College as an outcome-oriented effort to 
manipulate legal doctrine, it turns out to be remarkably hard—and theoretically 
intriguing—to specify the “outcome” that drove Cardozo’s reasoning.  One 
possibility is that he was trying to do justice in the individual case before him.  
That’s possible, but I have doubts.  I said earlier that the equities rarely strike 
me as especially compelling in contracts cases, and Allegheny College is no 
exception to the rule.  Cardozo recited no evidence whatsoever to suggest that 
the College suffered special harm when Johnston defaulted on her pledge.  As 
far as we know, for example, the College had not relied on Johnston’s gift to 
hire new faculty, start new programs, begin new construction projects, or 
anything else.  From what the opinion tells us, the College was simply out the 
gift, which made the College no different from any other disappointed donee.  
If the College was not specially harmed, was Mary Johnston guilty of some 
moral delict?  Perhaps Cardozo thought so.  He certainly invited a negative 
judgment upon her behavior.  He embraced, for example, an earlier court’s 
assertion that revocations of charitable pledges amount to “breaches of faith 
 
 21. Leon Lipson, The Allegheny College Case, 23 YALE L. REP. 8, 11 (1977).  Lipson’s 
witty and elegant observations are excerpted in KESSLER, GILMORE & KRONMAN, supra note 8, 
at 509-10. 
 22. Richard Posner has engaged in a highly statistical “citation analysis” in order to conclude 
that Cardozo in fact enjoys a high reputation.  RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN 
REPUTATION 74-91 (1990).  Isn’t a single law school named after Cardozo better evidence of high 
reputation than a boatload of citations? 
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toward the public.”23  Yet, not every revocation of a promise to a charity 
deserves moral censure.  Cardozo, if he knew anything about the circumstances 
that led Mary Johnston to change her mind, said nothing.  As it happens, she 
might have had good cause.  Richard Danzig, in unpublished research reported 
by Alfred Konefsky,24 unearthed evidence that puts Johnston in a favorable 
light.  Danzig interviewed Johnston’s acquaintances, and they told him that 
Johnston had withdrawn the pledge because she feared she could not otherwise 
provide properly for her impoverished cousins.  Moreover, Johnston may have 
believed that her $1000 payment to the College, far from being a down-
payment on her legacy (which is the way Cardozo construed it), was instead 
negotiated with College representatives as a release payment: Johnston thought 
that the College had accepted $1000 immediately in lieu of the right to receive 
$5000 after her death.25 
Let’s try another hypothesis.  Perhaps Cardozo was not driven by the 
desire to produce an equitable outcome in Allegheny College itself, but rather 
by a more forward-looking objective: perhaps he wanted to create a better rule 
to govern later cases involving charitable pledges.  If so, then Cardozo’s plan 
of attack immediately provokes interesting questions for anybody interested in 
judicial techniques.  If one wishes to affect the disposition of cases about 
charitable pledges, then an obvious strategy would be to articulate a rule 
tailored specifically to that subject.  That was apparently the approach of prior 
New York case law; Cardozo noted that the consideration doctrine had not 
been strictly applied in cases involving promises to aid a charity.26  It is also 
the approach adopted by the Restatement Second, which declares charitable 
subscriptions enforceable even in the absence of reliance.27  But Cardozo 
framed Allegheny College in terms of very general questions about the nature 
of consideration, rather than questions about exceptions to, or exceptional sub-
categories within, the broader doctrine. 
What’s more, Cardozo’s holding in Allegheny College seems poorly 
calculated to provide charities with enforceable rights.  His reasoning 
emphasized, first, that Mary Johnston had stipulated that her gift “should be 
‘known as the Mary Yates Johnston Memorial Fund’”28 (from which fact 
Cardozo inferred that she wanted the College to publicize her name) and, 
second, that the College had already accepted a portion of the gift (from which 
fact Cardozo inferred that the College had taken on a duty to publicize the 
gift).  The first of these facts might be relatively common—many (though 
 
 23. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175 (quoting Barnes v. Perine, 12 N.Y. 18, 24 (1854)). 
 24. Konefsky, supra note 10, at 657. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174-75. 
 27. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1979). 
 28. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175. 
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certainly not all) donors want a particular name (often their own, or a 
relative’s) attached to their gifts.  But the second fact—that the College had 
already received part of the gift—seems an accident.  If it is taken seriously as 
a prerequisite to recovery, then Allegheny College would benefit charities in a 
relatively narrow, and arbitrarily selected, range of cases.  Of course, one 
might suppose that Cardozo’s emphasis on the down payment was mere 
window-dressing; confronted with different facts in the future, he would have 
modified the doctrine in some clever way, and the charity would have won 
again.  Yet, not every charity was guaranteed that Cardozo himself would 
decide its case—and, what’s more, some careful readers of Cardozo (including 
his biographer, Andrew Kaufman) believe that he genuinely wanted to limit 
the circumstances in which charitable bequests would be enforceable.29 
Finally, if Cardozo’s goal was to produce a rule that would help charities, 
then his project compels us to think about the complex ways in which legal 
rules create incentives for private behavior.  Let’s assume that government 
should encourage people to give to charities.  There are various ways for the 
law to do that—such as, for example, by making charitable contributions tax-
deductible.  But there are at least two reasons to doubt how much charities 
would benefit from a rule that allows them to sue when donors get cold feet.30  
First, to the extent that donors know about the rule, it may discourage them 
from promising gifts in the first place: people may be less willing to make 
pledges to charities if they believe that by doing so they expose themselves (or 
their heirs) to the possibility of a lawsuit.31  Second, most charities depend 
upon the future good will of potential donors.  One wonders how many college 
fund-raising offices would follow the model of Allegheny College and sue 
donors who withdraw gifts.  Would alums be eager to pledge money to a 
college that sues its benefactors?32  A charity that litigates against its donors 
risks killing the goose that lays the golden egg.33 
 
 29. ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 334 (1998) (“[T]he fact that [Cardozo] strived so hard 
to find consideration . . . suggests that he was still not ready to enforce a pure pledge.”).  
Kaufman also suggests that Cardozo wanted to send “a message to charities about the necessity of 
honoring their obligations to donors.”  Id. at 335. 
 30. Not all courts have been persuaded that there are compelling reasons of social policy to 
enforce charitable requests in the absence of substantial reliance by the charity on the promise.  
See, e.g., Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691 (Mass. 1989) (in the 
absence of reliance, “there is no injustice in declining to enforce the decedent’s promise”); the 
general issue is discussed in the excellent treatise of E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 97-98 
& n. 38 (3d ed. 1999). 
 31. The brief for the Johnston estate in Allegheny College—a brief signed by, among others, 
future Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson—emphasized that the College’s pledge form did 
not announce itself to be a “‘contract’ or ‘promissory note.’ Many a cautious widow would shy at 
that!”  Konefsky, supra note 10, at 698-99. 
 32. Imagine, for example, that (as Danzig’s research suggested, see supra, note 24 and 
accompanying text) Mary Johnston withdrew her bequest because she wanted to care for an 
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Is there any other way to conceive of Cardozo’s objective in Allegheny 
College?  Perhaps his goal was more abstract: perhaps he meant to improve the 
law of consideration in general, rather than to fashion a better rule regarding 
the enforceability of charitable bequests.  Perhaps, for example, Cardozo 
intended to legitimate some version of promissory estoppel.34  His opinion 
probably had that effect.35  Cardozo adverted to the doctrine of promissory 
estoppel in order to justify his conclusion that elements of the consideration 
doctrine might be deemed satisfied by “implication”; he treated those decisions 
with approval, and thereby endowed the doctrine with a patina derived from 
the reputations of both Cardozo himself and the New York Court of Appeals, 
the nation’s most distinguished common law court.  But if Cardozo’s desired 
“outcome” in Allegheny College was to buttress the doctrine of “promissory 
estoppel,” then the case is odd in two ways.  First, Allegheny College is a 
bizarre vehicle for Cardozo’s purpose.  Professor Lipson was way off the mark 
when he said that with promissory estoppel Cardozo had “a shaky rule but 
(potentially) solid facts.”36  Much more the reverse is true.  The rule wasn’t so 
shaky.  According to Cardozo himself, New York had already “adopted the 
doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in 
connection with our law of charitable subscriptions.”37  The problem with the 
promissory estoppel doctrine, as with the consideration doctrine, was that the 
facts were bad for the College.  In the old New York cases on charitable 
subscriptions and promissory estoppel, there was clear evidence of reliance.  In 
Barnes v. Perine,38 for example, a religious society had demolished its old 
 
impoverished relative.  The College would risk a rather unflattering newspaper story—Konefsky 
suggests the headline, “Grasping College Decimates Old Woman’s Estate”—that would 
embarrass its fund-raising efforts in general.  Konefsky, supra note 10, at 683. 
 33. Mary Frances Budig, Gordon T. Butler and Lynne M. Murphy, who believe that charities 
should pursue more aggressive litigation policies against donors who try to back out of pledges, 
nevertheless observe that in practice, “[w]hen it comes to enforcing pledges, charities have 
demonstrated a timidity not characteristic of their solicitation practices.”  BUDIG, BUTLER & 
MURPHY, Pledges to Non-Profit Organizations: Are They Enforceable and Must They Be 
Enforced?, 2 TOPICS IN PHILANTHROPY 3 (1993).  According to the authors, “[c]harities seem to 
fear the loss of subscribers if it became the practice to sue to enforce the subscriptions.”  Still, to 
say that charities have been “timid” about bringing suit does not mean that they have never or 
rarely done so, and Budig et. al. compile an impressive list of cases in which charities have 
brought suit.  The list is powerful evidence that rights of the sort created by Cardozo in Allegheny 
College have been deemed valuable by some charities—and, presumably, the threat of suit may 
be valuable even under circumstances where, if push came to shove, the charity would retreat 
rather than sue. 
 34. For a forceful presentation of this view, see generally Mike Townsend, Cardozo’s 
Allegheny College Opinion: A Case Study in Law as Art, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1103 (1996). 
 35. Id. at 1144. 
 36. KESSLER, GILMORE & KRONMAN, supra note 8, at 510. 
 37. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 175. 
 38. 12 N.Y. 18 (1854). 
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church in reliance upon pledges of money to build a replacement.  One can 
understand why judges in that case would be sympathetic to the charity’s 
plight!  As we have already noticed, Cardozo presented no evidence of 
detrimental reliance by Allegheny College.  Run the facts of Allegheny College 
through today’s leading formulation of promissory estoppel—section 90(1) of 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts—and the College almost certainly 
loses.39 
If your goal is to highlight the need to reform the law so that reasonable 
reliance will render a promise enforceable, then Allegheny College is a lousy 
case to use: there’s no reliance, and if there were reliance, there would be no 
need for reform, since existing precedents would suffice.  If the “outcome” 
Cardozo was after was the legitimation of “promissory estoppel” or reliance-
based theories of recovery in general, then why not do it in a case like Siegel v. 
Spear,40 where detrimental reliance really was the core of the plaintiff’s claim 
and where the plaintiff could not invoke that theory absent significant reform 
to the law?41  Perhaps Cardozo was worried that Allegheny College was the 
best chance he would get.  During Cardozo’s tenure, the New York Court of 
Appeals assigned cases through a rotation system.42  Hence Cardozo could not 
claim the assignment in Siegel (although he could presumably have concurred 
separately, as he did in some other cases), and, if another case involving 
detrimental reliance came along, there was no guarantee that Cardozo would 
get the opinion.  So even if Allegheny College wasn’t a perfect case for the job, 
it was at least Cardozo’s case, and that was nothing to sneeze at. 
 
 39. As has already been mentioned, the Restatement (Second) contains an entirely separate 
provision, § 90(2), to render charitable subscriptions enforceable on facts like those of Allegheny 
College. 
 40. 138 N.E. 414 (N.Y. 1923). 
 41. Siegel is the first case I assign each year; it is wonderfully terse and rich.  I use it to teach 
students how to read a judicial opinion, and I often spend two full weeks poring over its 
intricacies.  In brief, Siegel had stored his furniture with the Spear company; he forebore from 
purchasing insurance in reliance upon a promise by Spear’s agent, McGrath, to get the insurance 
for him.  The Court of Appeals held that there was consideration for the promise.  The opinion is 
murky, but one thing that court said clearly was that, on its chosen rationale (whatever that was!), 
there was no need to “determine whether the plaintiff, in refraining from insuring through his own 
agent at the suggestion of McGrath surrendered any right which would furnish a consideration for 
McGrath’s promise.”  Id. at 416.  The court’s refusal to adopt a reliance-based theory becomes 
especially provocative if one compares it to the rationale adopted by the intermediate appellate 
court, which explicitly vetted the issue of promissory estoppel: the majority ruled for Siegel on 
the ground that “plaintiff’s abandonment of his purpose to insure, in reliance on the defendant’s 
promise, was a sufficient consideration for the defendant’s promise,” Siegel v. Spear & Co., 195 
A.D. 845, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1921), and the dissent objected that this amounted to “an 
application of what is spoken of in the text books as a promissory estoppel.” Id. at 848 (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
 42. Townsend, supra note 34 at 1134; KAUFMAN, supra note 29, at 132. 
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But if Cardozo’s desired “outcome” was to legitimate promissory estoppel, 
there’s another oddity about Allegheny College.  The opinion’s judgment about 
promissory estoppel is highly ambiguous.  At a minimum, it is quite certain 
that, as Konefsky says, Cardozo after “having twice raised the issue of 
promissory estoppel, dismissed it as a ground of decision.”43  It is certainly 
arguable that, as Gilmore wrote, “Cardozo’s opinion . . . was essentially a 
demonstration that the broad New York consideration theory made promissory 
estoppel an unnecessary and undesirable refinement.”44  In any event, 
Cardozo’s opinion left it unclear whether or not promissory estoppel was good 
law in the state of New York.45 
Gilmore’s characterization of Allegheny College suggests another, still 
more abstract “outcome” which might have motivated Cardozo.  Perhaps his 
objective was to produce a kind of judicial “restatement” of the law of 
consideration.  We are now getting closer to the truth about Allegheny College.  
Yet, to say that Cardozo wanted to produce a “restatement” of consideration 
only pushes the question back a level: why would anybody want to do that? 
“Well, to clarify the law and guide future decisions,” one might say.  A fair 
enough answer for a different judge and a different opinion—but not for 
Cardozo and Allegheny College!  Gilmore wrote that although “Cardozo 
succeeded to an extraordinary degree in freeing up . . . the law of New 
York . . . he went about doing this in such an elliptical, convoluted, at times 
incomprehensible, fashion that the less gifted lower court New York judges 
were frequently at a loss to understand what they were being told.”46  No 
opinion illustrates Gilmore’s statement better than does Allegheny College. 
The idea that Cardozo wanted to produce a “restatement” of the law is 
made even more mysterious by the fact that its topic was the arcane 
consideration doctrine.  This isn’t, after all, products liability and MacPherson 
v. Buick Motor Co.47  It is possible, I suppose, to believe that there are major 
social policy stakes involved in the fine points of legal doctrine governing the 
enforceability of gratuitous promises—but that seems implausible, and all the 
more so when one notices that the landmark cases involve such matters as an 
uncle’s promise to reward his nephew for steering clear of billiard halls,48 or an 
 
 43. Konefsky, supra note 10, at 649. 
 44. Id. 
 45. The most thorough review of the New York cases is William E. Nelson, A Man’s Word 
and Making Money: Contract Law in New York, 1920-60, 19 MISS. C. L. REV. 1, 30-32 (1998).  
The state of the law is sufficiently confusing that contracts casebooks have taken inconsistent 
positions about whether New York courts have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel.  
Townsend, supra note 34, at 1146 & n. 276. 
 46. Gilmore, supra note 20, at 75. 
 47. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).  A classic treatment of MacPherson and its impact is 
EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 20-25 (1949). 
 48. Hamer v. Sidway, 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
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Italian count’s effort to collect a marriage gift from his American father-in-
law.49  Of course, Cardozo was not the only person agitated by the issue—at 
the time, the country’s finest legal minds had passionate opinions one way or 
the other about consideration and promissory estoppel.50  But that historical 
fact only deepens the mystery.  What was everybody so excited about? 
The answer to that question will lead us toward what is, in my judgment, 
Cardozo’s real objective and away from the mistaken idea that Cardozo’s 
reasoning was designed to deceive or trick his readers.  But, insofar as we are 
interested in the capacity of Allegheny College to teach students about how to 
“think like a judge,” we should notice how far we have already come.  We 
have been pursuing the common opinion that Cardozo manipulated doctrine in 
Allegheny College to achieve an outcome he desired.  To make sense of that 
hypothesis, we have had to identify a series of increasingly abstract and subtle 
“outcomes” which Cardozo might have pursued.  Goals like “legitimating 
promissory estoppel” or “restating contract law” will come as surprising 
discoveries to many students: they have never imagined goals of this kind, 
much less that such goals might provide the moving force behind judicial 
decisions.  Even if Allegheny College were an outcome-oriented manipulation 
of doctrine, it would have a lot to teach—by the nature both of its 
“manipulation” and its “outcomes”—about judicial creativity and what it 
means to “think like a judge.” 
We have pending, though, an important question: why were so many 
lawyers, Cardozo included, so excited about consideration and promissory 
estoppel?  As I’ve already indicated, I do not think that the social policy stakes 
were anywhere close to high enough to explain the intense controversy over 
these issues.  The stakes were more distinctively jurisprudential: to take a 
position about promissory estoppel, one had to take a position on the more 
general question of whether and how it might be possible to offer a genuinely 
“legal,” as opposed to essentially legislative or simply political, resolution to a 
contested question of law.  This meant, among other things, developing a 
theory about what “precedent” was, and about whether it should (or even 
could) control judicial decision-making. 
These are, of course, among the perennial questions of Anglo-American 
legal philosophy, and they were being pressed vigorously around the time of 
Allegheny College by the American legal realists.51  Because the challenges 
posed by legal realism were so general, there is obviously no reason why they 
 
 49. De Cicco v. Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917).  De Cicco is, of course, another one 
of Cardozo’s opinions, and it has delights to match those of Allegheny College.  See generally 
Joshua P. Davis, Cardozo’s Judicial Craft and What Cases Come to Mean, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
777 (1993). 
 50. Townsend, supra note 34, at 1132-33. 
 51. Cardozo vigorously repudiated legal realism.  John C. P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 
51 STAN. L. REV. 1419, 1451-52 (1993). 
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had to be fought out in the arena of consideration doctrine—and, of course, 
that was not the only place where realists and their critics joined issue.  So why 
would consideration doctrine occasion such intense argument?  Sheer historical 
coincidence no doubt plays a part in the answer, but one can identify some of 
the fuel for the fire.  First, Langdell and Holmes had taken firm positions about 
the content of the “scientific” or “rigorous” consideration doctrine.52  
Intentionally or not, they thereby drew a line in the sand.  Second, as Mike 
Townsend has recently observed, at the time of Allegheny College Cardozo 
and the American legal community were immersed in controversy over the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement project.53  That project forced people to 
decide how (if at all) it was possible to bring order to the divergent common 
law precedents emerging from American state courts54 and, more specifically, 
how to describe the consideration doctrine.  Third, in the United States 
Supreme Court, the distinction between law and (other forms of) politics was 
being contested via cases about “the liberty of contract.”  Now, obviously, 
there is no doctrinal connection between the meaning of the Due Process 
Clause on the one hand and the consideration doctrine on the other.  The issues 
are joined, however, not only nominally (as questions about contractual rights) 
but at the level of political theory: to the extent that some lawyers and judges 
regarded contractual rights as somehow “natural,” “pre-political,” or 
determinable through “legal science” (and hence apolitical), that view could 
have implications both for the meaning of contractual liberty and for the 
content of contract doctrine.55  Fourth, in one important respect the 
consideration doctrine was vastly different from the constitutional debates 
about “liberty of contract” and the Due Process Clause: the policy stakes in the 
consideration debate were, as I have already noted, probably quite small.  
Absent any clear moral or economic reason to prefer one view of the 
consideration doctrine over another, arguments about stare decisis and the 
nature of legal reasoning (which might in other circumstances yield in the face 
of blunt policy concerns) proved decisive.  The consideration doctrine 
therefore involved an odd fusion of the intensely practical (judges and the 
American Law Institute had to take a stand one way or another on the 
question) and the purely jurisprudential (abstract convictions about judicial 
 
 52. Holmes had said, “It would cut up the doctrine of consideration by the roots if a 
promisee could make a gratuitous promise binding by subsequently acting in reliance on it.” 
Commonwealth v. Scituate Savings Bank, 137 Mass. 301, 302 (1883).  On Langdell, Holmes, and 
consideration in general, see GILMORE, supra note 1, at 12-22. 
 53. Townsend, supra note 34, at 1118-21. 
 54. John C.P. Goldberg, Community and the Common Law Judge, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1324, 
1329 (1990) (discussing Cardozo’s hope that the American Law Institute could bring order to the 
growing diversity of American precedents); see also Townsend, supra note 34, at 1119 (same). 
 55. Some of these connections are explored in MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1936 33-39 (1992). 
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technique may actually have played a decisive role in determining most 
people’s positions). 
In any event, I think that Cardozo’s complex analysis in Allegheny College 
can best be understood if we regard it as driven by, and as endeavoring to 
elaborate, a particular theory about what judges should do when confronted 
with inconsistent and apparently irreconcilable precedents.  The theory is this: 
the judge should endeavor to be faithful to everything and to produce some sort 
of dialectical synthesis of competing positions.  If this synthesis were done 
right, it would both be guided by policy judgments and also be a guide to 
social policy.  Cardozo seemed to imagine, in quasi-Aristotelian fashion,56 that 
competing legal precedents, doctrines, and theories all contained some part of 
the truth, and that the task of the common law judge was to distill the truth out 
of these positions by synthesizing them in a way that recognized and preserved 
what was valuable in each of them.57 
That, I think, is what Cardozo was getting at in a pair of elegant paragraphs 
discussing the relationship between “half truths” and “whole truths” in legal 
doctrine.  Cardozo began with what he called a “classic form of statement”58 
about consideration from the old case of Hamer v. Sidway.59  Yet immediately 
he did an about-face: according to Cardozo, Hamer’s “classic . . . statement” 
was “little more than a half truth” which required “many a supplementary 
gloss” in order to arrive at the “classic doctrine.”60  Cardozo next quoted the 
classic doctrine according to Holmes, Langdell, and Williston: “The promise 
and the consideration must purport to be the motive each for the other, in 
whole or at least in part.  It is not enough that the promise induces the 
detriment or that the detriment induces the promise if the other half is 
wanting.”61  But, Cardozo continued, “[t]he half truths of one generation tend 
at times to perpetuate themselves in the law as the whole truths of another.”62  
The consideration doctrine was no exception; indeed, said Cardozo, Holmes 
had noted in 1881 that some courts had departed from the “classic doctrine” of 
consideration, and Cardozo added that this “tendency toward effacement had 
 
 56. “[A]ll men lay hold on justice of some sort, but they only advance to a certain point, and 
do not express the principle of absolute justice in its entirety.”  ARISTOTLE, POLITICS 211 (H. 
Rackham trans. 1977). 
 57. In a discussion of Cardozo’s more overtly jurisprudential writing, John C. P. Goldberg 
described Cardozo as a “philosophical magpie” who gathered together “assemblages of 
quotations from a diverse group of legal scholars and philosophers.”  Goldberg, supra note 54, at 
1324. 
 58. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174. 
 59. 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891). 
 60. Allegheny College, 159 N.E. at 174. 
 61. Id.  (quoting a Supreme Court opinion by Holmes, and citing to both Williston and 
Langdell). 
 62. Id. 
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not lessened with the years.”63  Cardozo then launched his famous (famous 
among contracts teachers, at least!) discussion of promissory estoppel, and 
concluded by saying: 
[d]ecisions which have stood for so long and which are supported by so many 
considerations of public policy and reason, will not be overruled to save the 
symmetry of a concept which itself came into our law, not so much from any 
reasoned conviction of its justice, as from historical accidents of practice and 
procedure.64 
“The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate themselves in 
the law as the whole truths of another”—so what is the “whole truth” about 
consideration and which are the “half truths”?  There are at least two ways to 
answer that question.  The most obvious is to construe Cardozo to say that 
Holmes, Langdell, and Williston had articulated the “whole truth” about 
consideration.  That interpretation would appeal to lawyers schooled in the 
“classic doctrine.”  Viewed this way, Cardozo’s opinion sets up a contrast 
between messy precedent and pristine theory (the “whole truth”), and comes 
down on the side of respecting precedent, even at the expense of theoretical 
“whole truth.”  But there is another, quite different, and in my view more 
compelling, way to interpret Cardozo’s chain of argument.  What “whole 
truth” are we looking for?  The “whole truth” about consideration.  And since 
consideration is a legal doctrine, it seems implausible that any theory can give 
us the “whole truth” if it fails to account for significant lines of precedent.  On 
this reading, the classical Holmesian theory is not the “whole truth”—it’s just 
another “half truth.”  The “whole truth” is what Cardozo himself produces: an 
account of consideration which tries to synthesize and preserve some part of 
everything—Hamer v. Sidway, the “classic [but only half true] doctrine” of 
Holmes and Langdell and Williston, and the welter of common law precedents 
that were inconsistent with the “classic doctrine.”  How was it possible to 
incorporate the “classic doctrine” and inconsistent cases into a single theory?  
By retaining the form of the Holmesian half truth but allowing its elements to 
be proven through “implication.”  That is why Cardozo struggled to come up 
with a line of reasoning which turned out to be so complicated that it befuddled 
and perplexed several generations of students, lawyers, judges, and contracts 
professors! 
Cardozo’s effort was Herculean, not just in the general sense that it 
involved almost super-human feats of legal strength, but because Cardozo 
exemplified a judicial method which Ronald Dworkin later described by 
reference to a hypothetical judge named Hercules.65  Like Dworkin,66 Cardozo 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 175. 
 65. RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977); RONALD M. DWORKIN, 
LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986). 
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sought a middle ground between the formalist ideal of a legal science and the 
realist prescription that hard cases should be decided on the basis of social 
policy.67  Like Dworkin,68 Cardozo found that middle ground in an effort 
simultaneously to “fit” and “justify” legal precedent.  And like Dworkin,69 
Cardozo viewed the relevant domain of legal precedent very broadly—so that, 
for example, in Allegheny College Cardozo’s ruminations encompassed all of 
consideration doctrine, not just the cases most directly concerned with 
charitable subscriptions.  It is fitting that Dworkin used a Cardozo opinion to 
illustrate the jurisprudential protocol he favored.70  But if perhaps Cardozo 
helped inspire Dworkin, it bears notice that Dworkin’s theory improves upon 
Cardozo’s practice in at least one important respect.  Cardozo asked too much 
on the dimension of “fit.”  He tried to reconcile the irreconcilable.  In 
Allegheny College, Cardozo attempted to preserve both the Holmesian bargain 
theory and cases inconsistent with that theory.  In the end, his effort strikes me 
as unpersuasive, and I have the impression that most readers (and certainly 
most students) find it altogether baffling.  Perhaps because Cardozo wanted so 
much from fit, his references to “justification” were understated.71  Dworkin, 
by contrast, makes clear that his Hercules must sometimes reject precedents as 
“mistakes,” and, more fundamentally, that Hercules will have to choose among 
multiple plausible interpretations of the law on the basis of normative 
judgments about social justice.72 
There is thus a sense in which Gilmore was right when he suggested that 
Cardozo “was accustomed to hide his light under a bushel.”  If Gilmore meant 
only to describe the effect of Cardozo’s method, he was right—Cardozo’s 
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 67. Professor Goldberg is one of the few scholars who treats Cardozo’s legal reasoning as 
sincere, rather than as an outcome-oriented rhetorical exercise; Goldberg persuasively 
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1455. 
 68. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE, supra note 65, at 239. 
 69. Id. at 245. 
 70. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 65, at 118-19 (discussing 
MacPherson). 
 71. Cardozo himself may not have understood how much his opinions depended upon 
contestable judgments of value and policy.  In an important new book about the New York courts, 
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quest to reconcile opposites had the consequence of concealing (not only from 
readers, but probably from Cardozo himself) the judgments of policy and 
principle, which were in fact decisive to Cardozo’s reasoning.  But if Gilmore 
meant to describe the intent behind Cardozo’s machinations, then I think 
Gilmore was wrong.  Cardozo was not using doctrine to disguise innovations 
or to set up a smoke screen.  As John C. P. Goldberg has rightly observed, 
Cardozo’s opinions are “consumed by discussions of . . . concepts like . . . 
‘consideration’ . . . not because he thought such talk would seduce lawyers . . . 
[but] because he believed that law contains meaningful concepts [which] do 
and should guide judicial decisions.”73  The obscurities of Cardozo’s reasoning 
were the result of a sincere commitment to the impossible goal of fitting 
everything (or almost everything) in legal precedent, of finding and then 
preserving value even in theories and doctrinal formulae which Cardozo 
deemed unsatisfactory.74  The fact that this aspiration was doomed to failure 
does not render it any less interesting or noble.  If students can be made to 
understand why a judge might have such an ambition, and why even a judge so 
brilliant as Cardozo could not succeed at it, they will have learned a great deal 
about what it means to “think like a judge,” and so about how to “think like a 
lawyer.” 
The challenge is to convey to students the subtleties of Cardozo’s project.  
I spend three full class periods on Allegheny College.  In the first class, we 
unpack the doctrine of Allegheny College.  In the second class, we focus upon 
why Cardozo thought it necessary to treat the issue in such complex fashion.  
For the third class, I assign Dworkin’s article “How Law is Like Literature.”75  
I use Dworkin’s argument to provide the students with a theoretical model 
through which to comprehend Cardozo, and I use Cardozo to introduce 
students to the questions and insights that animate Dworkin’s theory.  The 
three classes are the capstone to a seven-week unit on promissory estoppel and 
consideration, all of which is designed to set up Allegheny College.  During the 
six weeks in the syllabus prior to the Allegheny College assignments, students 
learn competing theories about the enforceability of promises; they read 
 
 73. Goldberg, supra note 54, at 1452. 
 74. Professor Goldberg is apparently more optimistic about the success of Cardozo’s project 
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several of the precedents eventually discussed by Cardozo in Allegheny 
College; they become acquainted with figures like Holmes and Cardozo; and 
they get an introduction to ideas like the notion of “legal formalism.”  Most of 
all, I try to prod the students to develop a sense of mystery, wonder and 
curiosity about why judges were so agitated about the possibility that 
reasonable reliance might render a promise binding in the absence of 
bargained-for consideration. 
Even with all this time, planning and attention, Allegheny College remains 
a tough nut to crack.  The jurisprudential context of Allegheny College is 
conceptually demanding.  I find, though, that my students at NYU (admittedly, 
NYU gets exceptionally good students) rise to the challenge.  They take pride 
in their capacity to comprehend ideas and materials which they rightly perceive 
as difficult. They find satisfaction in the discussion of topics that engage their 
curiosity and their imagination.  They come away with a deepened 
understanding of what is at stake in legal argument, and many of them come 
away more excited about their legal education. 
It would undoubtedly be possible to achieve these goals outside contracts 
and without the help of Benjamin Cardozo.  Somebody might even suppose 
that Cardozo is a hindrance.  Wouldn’t it be better to use more recent 
exemplars to show students what it means to “think like a judge”?  After all, 
Cardozo’s exquisite anxiety about fidelity to legal precedent is not only unique 
but arguably anachronistic.  One might think that today’s judges, if they shared 
Cardozo’s sensitivity to questions of justice and social policy, would be more 
explicit about the relevance of such concerns.  That view, however, strikes me 
as mistaken in two respects, one sociological and the other pedagogical.  As a 
sociological matter, I think that judges today are as worried and confused as 
they were in Cardozo’s day about such things as the notion that “judges should 
apply the law, not make it.”  Hence the need for, and controversial reception 
of, Dworkin’s work.  As a pedagogical matter, I think it is a mistake to 
exaggerate the importance of “contemporary relevance” as a criterion for 
selecting assigned readings.  Readings ought to bring to the classroom 
something that would not otherwise be present.  “Contemporary relevance” is 
not lacking.  My students and I inevitably come to the classroom equipped 
with contemporary ideological prejudices.  Many students believe themselves 
to be concerned about nothing other than “contemporary relevance,” and of 
course faculty can count on them to read outlines and study guides even if we 
do not assign them—even, in fact, if we actively discourage students from 
such reading.  In the classroom, what I want from a judicial opinion is the 
manifestation of another mind, preferably both provocative and deep, though 
not so different from the students as to be inaccessible.  Cardozo’s opinions 
supply that admirably well, and “contemporary relevance” emerges (or at least 
I hope it does) from the process whereby my students and I collaborate to 
interrogate his writing. 
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My own judgment is that Contracts, where issues of judicial technique 
figure so prominently, and Cardozo, who was so smart and so sophisticated 
about such questions, provide nearly ideal vehicles for introducing students to 
the nature of judicial and legal creativity.  Perhaps that is one reason why 
contracts has proven to be such a durable element in the first-year curriculum.  
It is, in any event, the key to what I consider the most important objective in 
my own version of the course. 
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